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As economic and financial integration between the US and the euro area is strong, assessing 
whether the recent US crisis may affect the process of real and nominal convergence within the euro 
area is important. The paper addresses this issue in the framework of a large-scale open economy 
macroeconometric model, featuring 14 euro area member countries, the USA, and 35 advanced and 
emerging economies. The results point to a likely contribution of US economic and financial crises 
to real divergence in the euro area, potentially affecting first, second and third moments of the 
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  11. Introduction 
        Since the 1980s the European economy has undergone a progressive process of economic 
integration, involving both real and financial markets. This process has not been monotone, with the 
main stages marked by the introduction of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
March 1979, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, and the start of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999. Many studies have approached the issue 
from different perspectives, focusing on business cycle synchronization, inflation convergence and 
persistence, and financial markets integration. Though the available empirical evidence is not fully 
clear-cut, the finding of a stronger comovement in real and financial variables across euro area 
countries over the 1990s is fairly robust. Yet, so far EMU does not seem to have contributed to 
further increasing euro area economic and financial integration, relatively to pre-EMU levels. For 
instance, as regards to real convergence and the existence of a euro area business cycle, the 
evidence suggests that business cycle synchronization across euro area countries is still weak (de 
Haan et al., 2008, Camacho et al., 2005), concerning subsets of countries rather than the whole area 
(Aguiar-Contraria and Soares, 2009; Mink et. al., 2007; Giannone et al., 2009)
1, with stronger 
regional than international coordination (Montoya and de Haan, 2007). International trade emerges 
as one of the key sources of euro area business cycle synchronization (Bower and Guillemineau, 
2006), with a positive effect also on nominal convergence (Honohan and Lane, 2003). Convergence 
in inflation trends seems to have occurred within the euro area, though persistent inflation 
differentials remain, due to cyclical dynamics (Cavallero 2010, Angeloni and Hermann 2004). 
Evidence of recent divergence in inflation rates has been provided by Busetti et al. (2007). 
    Moreover, financial market integration, while benefiting at least in the aftermath of the EMU 
from the elimination of currency risk (Fratzscher et al., 2002), leading to a decrease in stock market 
volatility for the most volatile markets of the euro zone, i.e. Italy and Spain, relative to the least 
volatile ones, i.e. France and Germany (Morana and Beltratti, 2002), as well as to a reduction in the 
equity home bias for portfolios owned by European institutional investors (Adam et al., 2002), 
would be still in progress as, for instance, market participation of households across euro zone 
countries is still heterogeneous (Guiso et al., 2003). Actually, the degree of stock market integration 
could have even decreased in the last few years relative to the 1990s, as stock markets 
comovements appear to be stronger for subsets of countries rather than for the whole area (Morana, 
2010). 
    Since economic and financial integration between the euro area and the US is strong (Giannone 
et al., 2009; Morana, 2010), it is likely that the ongoing crisis, that heavily hit also the US economy, 
may have had an impact on the process of convergence in the euro area. This is consistent with the 
fact that symmetric shocks may have different effects across countries, according to the country-
specific degree of shock persistence. The convergence process should imply both a progressive 
reduction in the cross-country dispersion about the mean/median euro-area value of various 
macroeconomic indicators, as well as a more symmetric cross-sectional distribution. To provide a 
first look at the evidence, Figure 1 depicts the recent behaviour (2007-2009) of the distribution of 
several macroeconomic variables across 14 euro-area countries
2, showing that the crisis has so far 
had quite a deep impact on euro-area economic activity and some effects on its cross-sectional 
dispersion as well. In 2009 median GDP growth became negative (-3.6%), with a cross-sectional 
distribution featuring negative skewness and increased dispersion with respect to the previous two 
years. Some changes in the cross-sectional distributions of the output gap, the inflation rate and the 
unemployment rate can also be detected. All variables show pronounced skeweness, and changes 
                                                 
1: For instance, Aguiar-Contraria and Soares (2009) find that Germany, Austria, France, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg would form the euro-core, while Portugal, Greece, Italy and Finland are in the periphery. 
Yet, the evidence in favour of upward trend is weak at most. See also Mink et al. (2007). 
2: Each boxplot displays several elements of the distribution of each given variable across the euro-area countries: the 
mean (dot), the interquartile range (represented by the box, and capturing 50% of the data), and the median (line in the 
box).  
  2also in the dispersion around median values (-5.2%, 0.2% and 8.2% in 2009 for the output gap, the 
inflation rate and the unemployment rate, respectively). 
    In the light of the above evidence, the paper investigates the linkages between the US and the 
euro-area economies over the 1980-2009 period, aiming at assessing whether spillovers of 
macroeconomic and financial shocks from the US may have affected the convergence process of 
nominal and real variables in the euro area. While there is a vast literature on the economic and 
financial convergence in the euro area, we are unaware of other papers which have so far dealt with 
the likely consequences of the US crisis on the euro area convergence process. Moreover, the paper 
innovates in terms of the depth and wideness of the analysis and econometric methodology, 
providing an accurate investigation of the euro area-US macro/finance interface. In addition to 14 
euro-area member countries and the US, 35 additional economies, covering advanced and major 
emerging countries, have been considered, in order to set the analysis in a proper open economy 
framework. The econometric model then counts about 300 equations, considering key 
macroeconomic and financial variables, and is set in the factor vector autoregressive (F-VAR) 
framework. 
    The contribution of US crises to the euro-area convergence process has then been assessed by 
measuring the dynamic responses of key euro-area country macroeconomic variables to real and 
financial shocks originating in the US; the features of the cross sectional distribution of such 
dynamic responses over different horizons is then assessed, in order to gauge also some hints on the 
likely short- and medium-term consequences of the ongoing crisis. 
    The findings of the paper indeed point to a likely contribution of US real and financial factors to 
real divergence in the euro area; in fact, a slowdown in US economic activity may not only lead to a 
contraction in the first moment of the cross-sectional distribution of GDP growth in the euro area, 
but also to an increase in second and third moments. US financial factors may also contribute to the 
increase in dispersion and skewness of the euro area GDP growth distribution, but are less likely to 
affect its first moment. Differently, neither real nor financial US factors are likely to have affected 
the process of nominal convergence in the euro area during the current crisis, given the near 
independence of the euro area inflation rate distribution from the US real and financial cyclical 
dynamics. Not surprisingly, both real and financial US factors are found to be important for euro 
area financial convergence, consistently with the strong economic and financial integration of the 
two areas and the leading role of the US economy: destabilizing US financial conditions may have 
then contributed to destabilizing financial markets in the euro area. In particular, US excess 
liquidity, house and stock prices, would have contributed to euro area stock market fluctuations; 
moreover, the downturn in US GDP growth would have contributed to the contraction in euro area 
stock prices, as well as to the increase in volatility and downside risk for both house and stock 
prices. 
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the econometric 
methodology, while in section 3 the data and their properties are presented. Then, section 4 
discusses the specification and estimation of the F-VAR model and shows the main results. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
 
 
2. Econometric methodology 
    The econometric model is composed of two sets of equations. The first one refers to the US 
economy (with variables collected in vector  ), while the second to the other m-1 non-US 
countries (collected in vector  ). The joint dynamics of q macroeconomic variables for each of the 
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In (3) Zt is the n×1 stationary vector of variables of interest, with n=m×q, and 
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and   is the n×1 vector of reduced-form idiosyncratic (i.e. country-specific) i.i.d. 
disturbances. It is assumed that all polynomial matrices  ,  , and   have all roots 
outside the unit circle. Moreover, 
XY
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( ) L Φ ( ) L Ψ ( ) L D
0 jt is Ev η ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ , 0 ⎤ jt is E ηζ ⎡ = ⎣⎦ , and   for all i,j,t,s.  0 ⎤ = ⎦ jt is Ev ζ ⎡ ⎣
    The specification of the model has important implications for cross-country linkages: firstly, US 
idiosyncratic shocks ( ) do not only affect the US (through ), but also the other countries 
(through  ). Differently, non-US idiosyncratic disturbances ( ) do not affect US variables, 
while only own-country linkages are relevant for the other countries (  is block diagonal). 
The specification selected is then consistent with the view that the US play a leading role in the 
transmission of macroeconomic shocks, interpreting US macroeconomic dynamics in terms of 
global dynamics (see for instance Beltratti and Morana, 2010 and Bagliano and Morana, 2009); this 
however does not prevent interlinkages between the US and the other countries, which are 
parsimoniously described by means of the non-US factors  . 
X
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  4    By substituting (1) and (2) into (3), the dynamic factor model can be written in standard vector 
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where  [ ] tt E η ′ = ηη Σ ,  [ ] tt v E ′ = vv Σ , and  [ ] tt E ζ ′ = ζζ Σ . The inversion of the F-VAR form to obtain 
the reduced vector moving average (VMA) form for the   process, as well as the identification of 
the structural shocks, is discussed in Bagliano and Morana (2010). 
*
t Z
    In our analysis, the impact of a change in the variables of interest ( ) on the   block is 
investigated by exploiting the reduced form VAR structure of the model 
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  5    The latter is equivalent to the impulse response analysis carried out from the reduced form VMA 
representation, and is appropriate when the focus is on the impact of a change in a given forcing 
variable, say US GDP, independently of its underlying economic cause (i.e. a given structural 
shock), on the   block. The F-VAR model is estimated by means of a consistent and efficient 
iterative procedure, also featuring the Granger and Jeon (2004) robust approach, yielding median 
estimates for all the parameters of interest, obtained through simulation with 1000 replications (see 




3. The data 
    We use seasonally adjusted quarterly macroeconomic time series data, over the period 1980:1 
through 2009:1, for 14 euro area member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain), the US, and 
16 additional advanced economies (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, United Kingdom), 5 additional advanced emerging economies (Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, 
Poland, South Africa), and 14 secondary emerging economies (Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey), for a 
total of 50 countries.
3 
    The data set for euro area member countries consists of real GDP, the CPI all-items index, real 
bank loans to the private sector relative to GDP, the real short-term interest rate (either a 3-month 
interbank rate or a 3-month Treasury Bills rate, depending on availability), and real house and stock 
prices. Due to lack of data availability, housing prices have not been considered for Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia. A similar data set has also been 
employed for the remaining non-US countries (house prices are only available for few additional 
OECD countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK). All these variables are included in the   vector.  t Y
    Differently, the dataset for the US is larger and composed of real GDP, civilian employment, real 
private consumption, real private investment, fiscal deficit to GDP, current account deficit to GDP, 
CPI all items index, three-month Treasury Bills real rate, 10-year Federal government securities real 
rate, real house prices, the real effective exchange rate, real share prices (S&P500). Few financial 
variables have also been included, in order to monitor the impact of the financial crisis; in 
particular, the economic/financial fragility index and the excess liquidity index proposed in 
Bagliano and Morana (2010).
4 
 All the above variable enters in the vector  . In order to keep the US-euro area spillover analysis 
manageable, and consistently with with previous work on the Great Recession, only a sub-set of US 
macroeconomic and financial factors has been selected for the computation of dynamic multipliers, 
namely GDP growth, excess liquidity, house and stock prices and an economic/financial fragility 
indicator.
t X
5    Finally, also crude oil price and primary commodities (excluding energy) price shocks, 
                                                 
3: US data are from FRED2; OECD countries data are from OECD Main Economic Indicators, integrated with IMF 
International Financial Statistics (bank loans series); data for the other countries are from IMF International Financial 
Statistics; house price series for OECD countries are taken from a non official OECD database (see 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/linkto/ECO-WKP%282006%293). The authors are grateful to P. Donati, S. 
Ejerskov, P. Benczur, M. Jensen for help with some of the data. 
4: The economic/financial fragility index is computed as the first principal component extracted from the TED spread, 
the AGENCY spread, and the BAA-AAA corporate spread, providing an overall measure of credit/liquidity risk, stress 
in the mortgage market and risk appetite; the excess liquidity index is computed as the first principal component 
extracted from the M2 to GDP ratio and the total loans and leases at commercial banks to GDP ratio. 
5: For instance, Bagliano and Morana (2010) find that the trade channel is the likely key transmission mechanism of the 
US economic crisis to the rest of the world, while US housing and stock prices and excess liquidity would have  all 
  6computed following Hamilton (1996), have been considered and included in the vector F_{t}. In 
order to account for feedback effects from the world economy to the US economy, a single common 
non-US GDP growth factor, accounting for about 20% of total variance, has been extracted from 
the GDP growth series of the 37 countries for which data are available since 1980:1.
6 This factor is 
included as the only element in the   vector.  t G
os(2
        As the econometric model is set in a stationary representation, data have been transformed 
7accordingly; in particular, on the basis of the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992; Beckers et al., 
2006), the weak stationarity, in deviation or not from a non linear deterministic trend component, 
modelled by means of the Gallant (1984) flexible functional form, i.e.   
1 sin(2 / ) c / ) t tt T t T μ μμ μ π μ π =+ + + ₂₃
t
, was established for the levels of the long-term and 
short-term real interest rates, the US current account to GDP ratio, the US public deficit to GDP 




4. US economic and financial shocks and euro area convergence dynamics 
    The ordering of the variables in the econometric model is country by country and standard, from 
relatively "slow" to relatively "fast" moving variables. Then, the  vector for the US is ordered as 
follows: employment growth, real GDP growth, the Federal Deficit/GDP ratio, real private 
consumption growth, real private investment growth, the current account/GDP ratio, the CPI 
inflation rate, the excess liquidity index, the real three-month Treasury bills rate, the real ten-year 
Government Bonds rate, real house price returns, real effective exchange rate returns, real stock 
price returns, the financial fragility index. Similarly, the ordering for the   vector, concerning the 
non-US countries, is: real GDP growth, CPI inflation, real excess credit growth, the real short-term 
rate, real house price returns (when available), and real stock price returns. 
t X
t Y
    The dynamic specification of the econometric model has been selected by means of the BIC 
information criterion, pointing to an optimal first order F-VAR system. Assuming an own-variable 
diagonal structure for the corresponding elements of the D(L) matrix for the non-US countries, i.e. 
 diagonal, the euro area block then counts 77 equations, each containing 13 parameters, of 
which 1 for the lagged own variable, 5 are for the lagged US series, 3 for the lagged   and   
series, and 4 for the deterministic component (including a constant, a linear trend and two non-
linear components, as described in data section). Similarly, for the remaining elements in the vector 
. Differently, the 14 equations corresponding to the US block   contain 21 parameters each, of 
which 14 are for the lagged US series, 3 for the lagged   and   series, and 4 are for the 
deterministic component. The full system then counts 278 equations. 
() YY L D
t Y
t F t G
t X
t F t G
    The impact of the US economic and financial shocks on euro area convergence dynamics is 
assessed by means of the properties of the cross-sectional distributions of the dynamic multipliers, 
measuring the response of euro area variables to a unitary change in the US variables included in 
(7), at two forecasting horizons, namely 6-month (short-term) and 3-year (medium-term). This is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
contributed to the spillover of the US financial crisis to foreign countries. See also Levchenko et al. (2010) and Bems et 
al. (2010). 
6: That is, the largest 18 OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand), and a 
selection of the Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru), Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Turkey) and African countries 
(South Africa). 
7: Out of the 14 euro area member countries, there are 7 countries for which 6 macroeconomic series are available, 
yielding 42 equations, and other 7 for which only 5 macroeconomic series are available, yielding 35 additional 
equations, for a total of 77 equations. 
8: Details are not included for reasons of space, but are available upon request from the authors. 
  7consistent with the fact that a different degree of shock persistence in each country may lead a 
symmetric shock to have different effects across countries. The results reported in Table 1 and 
Figures 2-6 refer to the case of a unitary increase in the US variables; the effects of a unitary 
contraction in the US variables, which is the case of interest for some of the variables (output 
growth, for instance), can be read from the above Tables and plots by reversing the sign of the 
dynamic multipliers and associated statistics. 
 
4.1 The effects of US financial shocks 
    In a boom-bust credit cycle interpretation of the recent crisis (see for instance, Bagliano and 
Morana, 2010), asset prices misalignments in the US housing and stock markets would have 
initially been fuelled by the availability of excess liquidity and low interest rates.
9 The ballooning 
US trade deficit also likely contributed to the latter dynamics, as huge capital inflows were 
redirected from the Treasury and stocks markets to the housing market. Then, expected, but not 
materialized, housing price appreciation, would have lead the predatory lending mechanism to 
break down and to a generalized decline in asset prices and tight credit conditions, as financial 
institutions were forced into deleveraging and recapitalization.
10 Due to the strong integration of US 
and euro area (EA) financial markets (Giannone et al., 2009; Morana, 2010), and the leading role of 
the US economy, the US financial cycle should have affected financial markets in the EA economy 
as well. In particular, the spillover of the US financial crisis to the EA and the rest of the world 
economy, is likely to have taken place through housing prices (see Bagliano and Morana, 2010; 
Beltratti and Morana, 2010), as well as excess liquidity and stock market dynamics. 
    Results concerning the impact of US financial shocks over our investigated sample (12980-2009) 
on the EA convergence process are collected in Table 1 (columns 2 through 5) and Figures 3 
through 6, presenting descriptive statistics and corresponding box plots of the cross sections of 
dynamic responses of selected EA variables (GDP growth, inflation rate, real excess credit growth 
(the rate of change of real loans to GDP), real house price returns and real stock returns to various 
US disturbances over the 2- and 12-quarter time horizons. Several results are remarkable. 
    First, concerning the effects of the US financial shocks on real convergence, from Table 1 it can 
be noted that neither US excess liquidity, nor US housing or stock prices, or US economic/financial 
fragility, have a sizable impact on the median of the EA output growth distribution, neither in the 
short- nor the medium-term. Yet, in two cases, i.e. US housing prices and economic/financial 
fragility, the mean impact is sizable, and stronger in the short- (-0.2%, -0.34%) than in the medium-
term (-0.15% and -0.26%); moreover, US financial factors do have an impact on the second and 
third moments of the EA output growth distribution, with a sizable increase in both dispersion 
(0.29% through 1.1% in the short-term, apart from stock prices) and skewness (-2 through -2.8 in 
the medium-term). Second, concerning the effects of US financial factors on nominal convergence, 
it can be noted that, apart from the medium-term impact of US excess liquidity and 
economic/financial fragility dynamics on the dispersion of the EA inflation rate cross-sectional 
distribution (0.11% and 0.15%, respectively), no sizable effects on first, second and third order 
moments of the inflation rate distribution can be noted. 
    Finally, concerning the impact of US financial factors on financial convergence within the EA, 
much richer interactions, of similar size in the short- and medium-term, can be noted. For instance, 
mean credit growth is sizably affected by US excess liquidity (-0.95%), housing prices (1.19%) and 
economic/financial conditions (2%); the median impact is on the other hand somewhat smaller (-
0.2%, 0.09% and 0.84%, respectively); the impact on EA credit growth dispersion is also sizable 
(2.9% through 3.3%), as well as its impact on skewness (-2.4 through to 2.6). Similar findings hold 
                                                 
9: Recent empirical evidence for the US point out to a positive linkage between excess liquidity and house and stock 
prices, and to a negative linkage between interest rates and asset prices, with the latter being stronger than the former. 
See Bagliano and Morana (2010) for details. 
10: See also Bagliano and Morana (2010) for significant interactions between housing and stock prices during the 
deleveraging process. 
  8for EA house price returns, as US excess liquidity, house prices and economic/financial fragility 
conditions sizably affect both the mean (-0.41%, 0.49%, -0.21%, respectively), median (-0.69%, 
0.19%, -0.41%) and dispersion (0.97%, 0.65% and 0.99%) of the EA housing price distribution, 
while the impact on skewness is more attenuated. Differently, US financial factors, stock returns 
included, are important for both the first and second moments of the distribution of EA stock 
returns, while their impact on skewness is more modest; for instance, the mean (median) impacts 
are 13.9%, 26.7%, 0.46%, and -7.65%  (6.95%, 21.6%, 0.69%, and 0.42%) for US excess liquidity, 
house prices, stock prices and economic/financial fragility conditions; the impact on dispersion is 
also large (20.1%, 18.4%, 2.14%, 19.3%). 
    Overall,  US  financial  factors  appear  to  be important determinants of euro area financial 
conditions, coherent with the strong integration of financial markets between the two countries: 
destabilizing US financial conditions may have then contributed to destabilizing euro area financial 
markets. In particular, US excess liquidity, house and stock prices, may have contributed to keep 
momentum in the euro-area stock markets during the boom phase of the credit cycle, yet 
contributing to market crash during deleveraging. Similarly, US house prices would have 
contributed to the cyclical phase in euro area house prices; the interactions across financial markets 
are complex, involving not only first moments, but also second and third moments. 
 
 
4.2 The effects of US GDP shocks 
    There are different mechanisms that can explain how the US crisis originated in the financial 
sector then became an economic crisis, as both tight credit conditions and falling asset prices 
(wealth and Tobin's Q effects) may have constrained aggregate demand.
11 A present value model, 
relating future developments in dividends and rents to output dynamics, can also account for second 
round effects, linking the slowdown in real activity to asset prices deflation. According to the 
results reported in Levchenko et al. (2010) and Bems et al. (2010), external demand can then be 
singled out as one of the key mechanisms through which the slowdown in US economic activity has 
been transmitted to the world economy.
12     
    Results concerning the implications of US economic disturbances (captured in our framework by 
GDP shocks) for the convergence process in the euro area are collected in Table 1 (first column) 
and Figure 2. As for the effects of US recessions on the real convergence within the EA, it can be 
noted that a contraction in US GDP may lead to mean and median negative responses of EA GDP 
growth; the impact is in both cases anelastic, with a stronger point impact in the short-term (-0.34% 
and -0.13%) than in the medium-term (-0.26% and -0.11%); dispersion is also larger in the very-
short term (0.55%) than in the medium-term (0.42), while skewness is sizable, but similar at both 
horizons (about -2). Hence, the evidence does point to a role of the slowdown in US economic 
activity in the explanation of current real divergence in the EA; yet, apart from Greece (result not 
reported), cyclical responses still appear to be coordinated
13; the divergence effect also appears to 
be slightly attenuated in the medium-term, due to a smaller dispersion. Moreover, concerning the 
effects of US recessions on EA nominal convergence, the evidence does not support any direct 
linkage between the state of the US business cycle and inflation dynamics in the EA: in fact, neither 
first, nor second or third moments of the cross-sectional inflation distribution do seem to have been 
influenced. 
                                                 
11: The empirical evidence is consistent with a linkage between asset prices and aggregate demand, pointing to an 
inelastic response of real activity, particularly for housing prices (Bagliano and Morana, 2010; Beltratti and Morana, 
2010; Case et al., 2005; Chirinko et al., 2004; Carrol et al., 2006). 
12: Levchenko et al. (2010) report a contraction in US imports of about 40% relatively to the level which would 
otherwise had occurred in a no-crisis environment. Moreover, according to Bems et al. (2010), real workd trade 
declined 15% between 2008Q1 and 2009Q1, and 27% of the fall in US GDP was trasmitted to foreign countries through 
a demand spillover, affecting durable goods in particular. 
13: The negative correlation of the Greek business cycle with the euro area business cycle is a well established fact in the 
literature. See for instance Bower and Guilleminau (2006). 
  9    Finally, concerning the effects of the contraction in US GDP on EA financial convergence, while 
for housing prices only the dispersion of the cross-sectional distribution seems to have been affected 
in both the short- and medium-term (0.88% and 1.69%, respectively), more sizable effects can be 
detected for credit growth and stock returns; in both cases a contraction in US GDP is associated 
with negative mean and median responses, stronger in the medium-term (-0.34% for credit; -19.3% 
for stock returns) than in the short-term; the impact on dispersion and skewness is also notable for 
both stock returns (20%, -1.07) and credit growth (3.94%, -2.74). Hence, euro area financial 
convergence may have been affected by the slowdown in US GDP growth, particularly in the credit 




    The aim of the paper is assessing whether the US economic and financial crises may have some 
effect on the process of real and nominal convergence in the euro area. The current paper addresses 
this issue by investigating the linkages between the US and the euro are countries for a large set of 
real and financial variables over the 1980-2009 period. In addition to 14 euro area member 
countries and the US, 35 additional countries, covering advanced and major emerging countries, 
have been included in the econometric model, set in the factor vector autoregressive (F-VAR) 
framework. 
    The findings of the paper indeed point to a likely contribution of US real and financial factors to 
real divergence in the euro area; in fact, a slowdown in US economic activity may not only lead to a 
contraction in the first moment of euro area GDP cross sectional distribution, but also to an increase 
in second and third moments; US financial factors may also contribute to the increase in dispersion 
and skewness of the euro area output growth distribution, but are less likely to affect the first 
moment of the distribution. Differently, neither real nor financial US factors are likely to have 
affected the process of nominal convergence in the euro area during the current crisis, given the 
near independence of the euro rate inflation distribution from the US real and financial cyclical 
dynamics. Both real and financial US factors are found to be important for euro area financial 
convergence, coherent with the strong economic and financial integration for the two areas and the 
leading role of the US economy: destabilizing US financial conditions may have then contributed to 
destabilizing euro area financial markets. In particular, US excess liquidity, house and stock prices, 
would have contributed to euro area stock market fluctuations, while US house prices would have 
contributed to euro area house prices cyclical dynamics; moreover, the downturn in US GDP 
growth would have contributed to the contraction in euro area stock prices, as well as to the increase 
in volatility and downside risk for both house and stock prices. Overall, the interactions between US 
and EA real and financial markets appear to be complex, involving not only first moments, but also 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the cross section of dynamic responses for euro area variables: 
mean, standard deviation, first, second (median) and third quartile, index of skewness and kurtosis. 
 US  variables 
    GDP  excess liquidity  house prices  stock prices  fragility index 
Responses    2 12  2  12 2 12  2 12  2 12 
mean  0.336 0.264 -0.081 -0.057 -0.198  -0.152 -0.007 -0.005 -0.340 -0.256 
std. dev  0.554  0.415  0.287 0.217 0.623  0.472 0.068 0.052 1.098 0.830 
Q1  0.050 0.050 -0.110 -0.090 -0.120  -0.095 -0.005 -0.005 -0.450 -0.340 
Q2  0.130  0.110  0.010 0.010 -0.030  -0.020 0.001  0.001  -0.050 -0.050 
Q3  0.300  0.260  0.050 0.045 0.005  0.005 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012 





kurt  6.650  6.686  7.869 7.906 9.613  9.603 7.425 7.665 7.579 7.557 
 
mean  -0.029  -0.042  -0.009 -0.023 -0.003 -0.004 0.006  0.008  0.039  0.076 
std. dev  0.055  0.066  0.069 0.111 0.022  0.037 0.010 0.010 0.088 0.147 
Q1  -0.082  -0.113  -0.032 -0.055 -0.025 -0.032 0.001  0.001  -0.030 -0.036 
Q2  -0.010  -0.026  -0.011 -0.032 -0.005 -0.008 0.003  0.004  0.031  0.034 
Q3  0.005  0.008  0.022 0.028 0.012  0.022 0.004 0.007 0.085 0.159 




kurt  2.709  1.584  5.053 5.850 1.830  2.015 6.638 3.755 2.539 2.406 
 
mean  1.260 1.145 -0.939 -0.954 1.170 1.188 -0.083  -0.099  1.995 1.815 
std. dev  3.941  3.435  3.337 2.925 3.707  3.313 0.367 0.319 3.953 3.100 
Q1  -0.145  -0.135  -0.850 -1.115 -0.235  -0.250 -0.160 -0.175 0.010  -0.010 
Q2  0.280 0.340 -0.160 -0.200 0.100 0.090 -0.060  -0.080  0.670 0.840 
Q3  0.620  0.590  0.170 0.175 0.660  0.700 0.000 0.005 1.520 1.615 




kurt  9.972  9.497  9.000 8.173 9.357  8.760 5.944 5.499 6.781 5.896 
 
mean  0.020 -0.141  -0.257 -0.407 0.417 0.486 0.024 0.027 -0.219 -0.201 
std. dev  0.876  1.694  0.632 0.967 0.760  0.654 0.046 0.067 0.503 0.986 
Q1  -0.605  -1.360  -0.945 -1.287 0.038 0.080 -0.015  -0.035  -0.672 -1.202 
Q2  -0.025  -0.055  -0.260 -0.695 0.085 0.185 0.014 0.015 -0.365 -0.405 
Q3  0.550  0.797  0.055 0.153 0.253  0.542 0.033 0.070 -0.005 0.008 





kurt  2.401  2.632  1.486 1.192 3.561  3.044 2.151 1.390 1.393 1.903 
 
mean  21.78  25.30  11.81 13.86 24.09  26.59 0.543 0.464 -6.764 -7.649 
std. dev  20.05  22.16  15.43 20.09 16.73  18.37 1.903 2.143 16.17 19.29 
Q1  8.555  9.905  2.265 2.680 10.39  11.09  -0.750 -1.020 -20.80 -19.40 
Q2  17.60  19.30  7.080 6.950 23.40  21.60 0.630 0.690 0.390 0.420 
Q3  26.05  29.10  13.85 14.20 28.85  37.60 1.475 1.760 1.095 1.445 





kurt  4.640  3.348  2.685 2.919 2.020  1.763 2.433 2.865 2.357 2.843 
 
 









































  Figure 1. Box plots of the distribution of GDP growth, output gap, inflation rate and 
unemployment rate in 2007-2009 for 14 euro-area countries. 
 
    Note: the box plots in this and the following figures show, for each distrubution, the mean value 
(represented by a dot), the median value (a straight line), the interquartile range (IQR, containing 
50% of the observations, represented by a box), and the values that are outside the first and third 
quartiles but within the first (third) quartile minus (plus) 1.5 times the IQR (represented by vertical 
lines ending with a staple). 
     





















































Figure 2. Responses of euro area macro variables to a US output 1% increase at the 2- and 
12-quarter horizons. 
 
     




























































   Figure 3. Responses of euro area macro variables to a US excess liquidity 1% increase at the 
2- and 12-quarter horizons. 
 
     























































Figure 4. Responses of euro area macro variables to a US house prices 1% increase at the 2- 
and 12-quarter horizons. 
 
     





























































Figure 5. Responses of euro area macro variables to a US stock prices 1% increase at the 2- 
and 12-quarter horizons. 
 
     



















































Figure 6. Responses of euro area macro variables to a US financial fragility index 1% 
increase at the 2- and 12-quarter horizons. 
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